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I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this paper by Ricardo Caballero, 
Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. This paper was described to me as a 
mix of theoretical and empirical work that attempts a hat trick: explaining the joint 
combination of global imbalances, the deflation of the housing price bubble that created 
the subprime crisis, and volatile oil prices. Given the scope of this undertaking, it 
is not really surprising that the authors deliver only on the theoretical part—the empirical 
analysis takes up only about 5 of the paper’s 55 pages.  Because this is a paper mainly 
about theory, I will devote my comments mostly to the framework the authors present, 
with particular emphasis on the basic assumptions made. 
The paper rests on two building blocks familiar from the authors’ earlier work. 
First, emerging market economies are increasing their demand for sound and liquid 
financial assets over time. Essentially, the residents of those countries want a safe store 
for their newfound wealth. This demand is treated by the authors entirely as a private 
sector phenomenon, but governments play a role because safe, liquid assets are in scarce 
supply. Indeed, one government alone, that of the United States, creates the Treasury 
instruments that are especially prized in investors’ portfolios.1 Second, fluctuations in 
commodity prices (or oil prices—the authors refer to both interchangeably) are explained 
to an important extent by speculative hoarding. 
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The model that the authors build to explain these features can be described 
succinctly. There are two regions. One, the United States, is  endowed with “trees.” The 
other, the emerging market economies, has a fixed endowment of an unspecified 
commodity. Only these two goods exist, and people in both regions consume both. Little 
trees grow at a positive rate. Commodity supplies do not grow at all. The last two 
assumptions imply a secular increase in the stock of trees relative to that of the 
commodity, so that the price of the latter rises over time. 
The inconvenient fact, however, is that the actual run-up in world commodity prices 
relative to the prices of other goods is a very recent phenomenon (which in recent  
months has abruptly unraveled). In fact, since about the turn of the eighteenth century, 
real commodity prices have been on a secular decline, as shown in my figure 1, taken 
from a recent paper I co-wrote with Kenneth Rogoff.2  Thus, the model is broadly at odds 
with the big picture that emerges from this roughly two-and-a-quarter-century history. 
However, since this implication of the model fits well with the cyclical pattern of 
commodity prices between about 2000 and 2007 (the period the authors are most 
interested in explaining), I will focus my remarks on some of the core model’s other 
simplifying assumptions that I  find more problematic. 
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THE MODEL LACKS A FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The paper purports to examine a financial crash, and the word “financial” is used 
liberally throughout. Dictionary.com defines “financial” as “1. pertaining to monetary 
receipts and expenditures; pertaining or relating to money matters; pecuniary: 
financial operations; 2. of or pertaining to those commonly engaged in dealing with 
money and credit.” Thus, the authors’ use of the word is difficult to reconcile with the 
fact that their model is a real model, with neither money, nor credit, nor financial 
intermediaries, nor exchange rates—in short, without a financial sector. 
 
 4
THE MODEL LACKS AN OFFICIAL SECTOR 
Further, lacking a financial sector, the model has no scope for the stockpiling of 
international reserves by the central banks of emerging market economies. Yet given that 
the worst financial crises of the late 1990s originated in emerging markets (followed 
in the next decade by crises in Argentina and Uruguay), it is worth noting that the key 
driver of the demand for U.S. Treasury securities from emerging markets has been the 
official sector (central banks trying to build a war chest), not the private sector as stressed 
in the model. Private demand for U.S. assets in the run-up to the 2007 crisis came 
primarily from other developed economies. The clear manifestation of the United 
States’ “exorbitant privilege” can be seen in the fact that foreign official 
acquisitions of U.S. government securities have accounted for an increasing 
share of total issuance (figure 2). 
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This massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves would seem 
central to understanding recent developments regarding the global imbalances 
between the developed economies and emerging markets—notably 
in Asia, as Vincent Reinhart and I have discussed elsewhere.3 This role for 
the official sector is something that the authors may want to incorporate in  
a future variant of their framework, as it provides another important argument 
for one of their central premises, namely, that “safe assets” are in short supply in 
emerging markets. 
THE DETERMINANTS OF SAVING ARE OVERSIMPLIFIED 
  To explain aggregate saving, the authors have to assume that it results from the 
birth of new generations and the return on accumulated savings. There is no role for 
financial liberalization (and the related issue of liquidity constraints) or wealth 
effects.4 Specifically, the only way the saving rate can decrease in the 
model is with an increase in the death rate. How can such a model possibly 
explain the roughly 7-percentage-point reduction in the U.S. saving rate 
over the past two decades? In light of the model’s emphasis on crossborder 
saving differentials and asset demands, revisiting this rather restrictive 
premise is called for. 
 
THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODEL 
Lastly, there is no uncertainty in the authors’ model, and thus no reason for a risk 
premium to exist, let alone to rise during a crisis, and the value of the nonstorable good as 
collateral should always be known. Hence the key event analyzed in the model is hard to 
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reconcile with the model. We are told that a subprime shock “can be interpreted as the 
realization that financial instruments are less sound than they were previously perceived 
to be.” In the absence of financial instruments and uncertainty, it is hard to imagine how 
such a shock would take place. 
In fact, the subprime crisis as depicted in the model is an exogenous 
and adverse terms-of-trade shock. The structure of the model precludes 
overborrowing, leveraging, or excessive risk taking. Similarly ruled out 
are herding behavior by investors and the nonlinearities that produce 
self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, absent in this framework are any of the 
mechanisms crucial to this or any other financial crisis. As for the key 
mechanism, the U.S. terms of trade, its decline began in 1999, and so it 
matches neither the timing nor the magnitude of the current financial 
crisis. 
I find this an important paper that offers two key insights. The first is 
the importance of understanding the scarcity of safe “saving vehicles” in 
the emerging (and the not-so-emerging) world, and of the United States’ 
as the provider of such assets. (The stampede into U.S. Treasury securities 
in the fall of 2008 attests to this scarcity.)5 The second is that this scarcity 
is related to the commodity price dynamics of recent years. This is not, 
however, a framework that lends itself to explaining or understanding 
financial crashes in general. In particular, it does not add to our understanding 
of traditional banking crises or the problems that produced the 
current subprime crisis. 
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My preferred diagnosis of the subprime financial crisis in the United 
States is spelled out simply in the following quotation: “[Overindebtedness] 
may be started by many causes, of which the most common appears 
to be new opportunities to invest at a big prospective profit . . . such as 
through new inventions, new industries, development of new resources, 
opening of new lands or new markets. Easy money is the great cause of 
over-borrowing.” That the essence of the problem can be captured so simply 
is encouraging. What is discouraging is that this insight was made by 
Irving Fisher in 1933.6 Crises recur, but the best explanations are eternal. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. An influential paper by Gourinchas and Hélène Rey, “From World Banker to World 
Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege,” Working 
Paper 11563 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), 
examines the consequences of this “exorbitant privilege” (a phrase that, the authors note, 
originated not with Charles de Gaulle, as is commonly held, but with his then-finance 
minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) whereby the United States alone is able to issue what 
are viewed as the safest of assets. 
 
2. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 
 
3. Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart, “Is the US Too Big to Fail?” (VoxEU, 
2008). www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/2568. 
 
4. See Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Luis Servén, “Saving across the World: Puzzles and 
Policies,” Discussion Paper 354 (Washington: World Bank, 1997), for cross-country 
evidence on these issue. 
 
5. See Reinhart and Reinhart, “Is the US Too Big to Fail?” on this episode: “If this had 
happened to any other government in the world whose national financial institutions were 
in as deep disarray as those of the US, investors would have run for the hills—cutting off 
the offending nation from global capital markets. But for the US, just the opposite has 
happened. Rather than facing prohibitive costs of raising funds, US Treasury Bills have 
seen yields fall in absolute terms and markedly in relative terms to the yields on private 
instruments. This has been called a ‘flight to safety.’ But why do global investors rush 
into a burning building at the first sign of smoke?” 
 
6. Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica 1, 
no. 4 (1933): 348 (italics in original). 
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